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This paper lays out some of the broad trends and  traditional sources of revenues - the tu.nover,
issues now emerging as socialist economies  company profits, and payroll taxes - remain the
attempt to reform their systems of taxation.  most important taxes, but they become more
Particular attention is paid to Hungary and  fine-tuned. They are often joined by new and
Poland, the most advanced in the reform process,  unique taxes that attempt to mimic market
but short discussions of Czechoslovakia, Yugo-  forces, such as a levy on fixed assets, an exccss
slavia, and the U.S.S.R. arc also included.  wage tax, and a tax to extract rents from CMEA
trade. The incentive effects of taxes in this stage
Although the fiscal system of every socialist  tend to be muted by the very ad hoc, discretion-
country has its unique characteristics, there  ary, individually negotiated nature of tax liabili-
appcars to be a distinct series of stages through  ties.
which these systems have passed or will pass on
the road from full central planning to a largely  Several countries of Eastern Europe arc now
free market economy.  The  first stage, classical  moving  into the  third stage, post-socialist
socialism,  prevailed  in the first  two to three  transition.  The tax changes  needed  to adapt to a
decades after World War 11  and was character-  market economy are fundamental and systemic.
ized by central control of many economic  But three sets of problems - related to macro-
variables - including input and output mix,  economic concems, enterprise ownership and
pricing, and income distribution. Tax systems  structure, and institutional weakness - impose
tended to be very rudimentary tools to capture  constraints on the design of tax policy during the
economic surplus and transfer revenues to the  transition. Maintaining revenues to insure
state. Taxes consisted primarily of a mixture of  budget balance is crucial for macroeconomic
turnover taxes and taxes on factors of produc-  stabilization. However, institutional weakness
tion. They were paid almost exclusively by  combined with the demands of rapid privatiza-
firms in the socialized sector.  tion threaten to erode the traditional revenue
base (based as it has been on high rate and often
The second  stage,  reform  socialism,  began  in  ad hoc and discretionary  taxes that are incompat-
the 1960s and early 1970s in many socialist  ible with private sector development). Thesc
economies and remains until today in some.  It  constraints are well-illustrated in the currcnt
has typically coincided with expanded decen-  fiscal situation in Hungary and Poland, and they
tralization of economic decisionmaking and  are likely to arise in other countries - including
greater autonomy for enterprise managers - and  Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R.
been characterized by the emergence of a  - as they move toward fundamental fiscal
fledgling independent role for the tax system in  reform.
directing economic activity. In this stage the
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As socialist  countries  move toward  market  systems,  fiscal  policy  is an
important  part of their  reform  agenda.  First,  they need to reorient  public
spending  to focus  more on the  provision  of "public"  goods.  Second,  they  need
to  adopt  more  selective,  predictable,  and  nondiscretionary  means  to  finance  such
spending.  Although  many  developed  and  developing  countries  have  faced  challenges
of the  same  general  type  in the  last  decade,  the  reforming  socialist  economies
are  fund-,mentally  different because of  the  enormous magiitude of  the
transformation--in  both  policies  and  institutions--that  is  required.
Unce 'ainties  and  tradeoffs  are  magnified  manyfold  in such  an  environment.
The  goal  of this  paper  is to lay  out  some  of the  broad  trends  and  issues
now  emerging  as  socialist  economies  attempt  to  reform  their  systems  of  taxation.'
The primary  focus  is on Eastern  Europe,  although  many of the same  trends  and
issues arise in the  reforming socialized  countries of Asia  and Afric-a.
Particular  attention  is  paid  to  Hungar;  and  Poland,  which  are  most  advanced  in
the  tax  reform  process. The  experiences  they  have  had  and  the  problems  they  are
facing  provide  valuable  lessons  for  those  countries  just  starting  on  the  reform
process.
Historical  Trends:  The  Changing  Role  for  Tax  Policy
Although  the fiscal  system  of every socialist  country  has its unique
characteristics,  there  appears  to  be a distinct  series  of stages  through  which
I  This  paper  is concerned  only  with explicit  taxes  that  are  part  of the
formal  tax system. It does not consider  quasi-  or implicit  "taxes"--such  as
those arising from inflation,  overvalued  exchange  rates, or negative real
interest  rates--that  also  impose  significant  financial  burdens  in  many  socialist
economies.2
these systems have passed or will pass on the road from full central planning
to a largely free market economy.  Both the goals and the natterns of taxation
differ markedly  in each  stage.  These  stages mirror  closely the stages of
economic reform more  generally.  For simplicity, this discussion follows a
tripartite  division  suggested  by Prof.  Janos  Kornai--classical socialism,  reform
socialism, and post-socialist transition. 2
Classical socialism: traditional  central planning
The countries of Eastern Europe (except  Yugoslavia) practiced traditional
central  planning for  the first  two to  three  decades after  World War II.  In  these
economies, central authorities tried to control most major economic variables-
-including input and output mix, pricing, and income and wealth distribution-
-through the plan.  Tax systems tended to be very rudimentary tools to capture
economic  surplus  and transfer  revenues  to  the state. 3 Virtually  all tax  revenues
were  paid by firms in the socialized sector.  They consisted primarily of a
mixture of  turnover taxes4  and taxes  on  factors  of  production--generally  on  labor
(payroll  taxes  and social insurance  fees)  and  capital (company  "profits"  taxes).
Of these,  the turnover tax  was the  most important  in revenue  terms.  These  major
2  Professor Kornai discussed these three regimes in a recent presentation
to the World Bank's Executive Directors.
3  In the theory of classical socialism, enterprises do not exist as
independent economic agents; they are in effect subdepartments of the state.
Consequently, all profits should accrue to the state and all losses should be
covered by the  state, with  taxes having no  incentive function at all.  In
practice, however, high administrative and information costs prevent perfect
control of economic variables and enterprise  behavior by the center.
4  Strictly speaking, levies on turnover  can be either positive (taxes)  or
negative (subsidies).  Although the discussion in this paper focuses only on
taxes, the reader should keep in mind that revenues from turnover taxes are
typically offset to some extent in socialist systems by consumer and producer
subsidies.3
taxes were at times supplemented  with taxes on agricultural land (usually crop
rather  than  cash payments),  urban  property, non-wage  personal  '.ncome,  and
"excess"  wages or profits, although the latter two in particular  were typically
very small sources of revenue.
Although  rudimentary  by  Western  standards,  these  tax systems  could  be  quite
complex because of  the fine  differentiations  within them, in  effect  an extension
of  the  fine  differentiations  in  the  economic  plan.  Turnover  taxes were
intertwined with  other  types  of  controls  as tools  to capture  revenue  and
determine prices and subsidies.  Usually there  were hundreds of rates, and they
were  set and changed in an ad hoc manner.  Company taxes were  also highly
variable from enterprise to enterprise and from year to year.  Company profit
taxes were designed generally to transfer the great bulk (if not all) of net
enterprise income to the state  budget.  Because the state  was the owner of most
productive assets and had many other tools at its disposal to steer economic
activity,  discretionary and ad hoc  changes in  the tax regime were  neither
unexpected nor highly disruptive to production.  In fact, the role of the state
as tax collector  was hardly distinguishable from its role as owner, and many of
the levies called "taxes" (particularly  those on company  protits) could in fact
be seen as returns derived from capital ownership.
The scope for independent analysis of fiscal policy would obviously be
limited in such a setting.  Tax policy analysts in  western market eco-nomies  are
accustomed to  thinking of taxes  as tools to  accomplish certain  social and
economic goals.  Some analysts focus on the incentive  effects of taxation--such
as their impact on investment, employment, and prices.  Others concentrate on
the ability of tax systems to redistribute income from richer to poorer.  Still
others are  concerned  primarily  with the  ability  of a  tax system  to  raise  revenues4
to  finance government spending, thereby avoiding fiscal  deficits and
macroeconomic  instability.  In  a traditional  centrally  planned  economy,  "taxes"
by themselves  (as  distinct  from  other  controls,  such  as  central  plan  directives
for enterprises,  price controls,  labor regulations,  and so on) have little
independent  role  to  play  in  raising  revenue,  providing  incentives,  or improving
equity.
Reform  socialism
The  second  stage  in  the  transition,  reform  socialism,  is  characterized  by
the emergence  of a  fledgling  independent  role  for  the tax  system  in directing
economic  activity.  This stage  began in the 1960s  and early 1970s in many
socialist  economies  and  remains  until  today  in  some,  including  the  U.S.S.R.  and
China. The  stage  typically  coincided  with  expanded  decentralization  of  economic
decision  making  and greater  autonomy  for  enterprise  managers. Given  this  new
managerial  autonomy,  authorities  found  that  they  needed  indirect  levers  f-T  the
first  time  to influence  economic  variables  and  capture  economic  surplus.
While still  somewhat  rudimentary  by Western standards,  tax systems  in
reform  socialist  economies  have  generally  been  more  sophisticated  than  those  in
classical  centrally  planned  systems. The traditional  sources  of revenue,  the
turnover,  company  profits,  and  payroll  taxes,  remain  the  most important  taxes,
but their  roles  change  somewhat. Turnover  tax rates  tend  to become  even  more
differentiated,  as  their  price-regulating  function  becomes  even  more  predominant.
At the  same  time,  profits  tax  rate  structures  may  become  somewhat  more  uniform
across  sectors  (at  least  on paper)  in  an attempt  to spur  efficiency  in  the  use5
of resourc  a." The incentive  effects  tend  to  be  muted,  however,  by the  very  ad
hoc, discretionary,  individually  negotiated  nature  of tax liabilities. The
enormous  discretion  of authorities  to change  tax rules -. will--often  after
profits  have  been  made--is  both  a  major  cause  of the  soft  budget  constraints  of
firms  and  an important  disincentive  to improved  efficiency.'
In addition,  new  and  unique  taxes  have  often  been  introduced  in  reforming
socialist  countries  in an attempt  to mimic  market  forces. One example  is the
levy  on fixed  assets,  widely  introduced  in  socialist  countries  in the  19609  to
stimulate  more efficient  use of capitel.' Such levy  mandates  the payment  to
the state  of a preset  rate  of return  on assets  regardless  of actual  profits.
In 1965,  for  example,  the  U.S.S.R.  instituted  a tax ("profit  payment")  on the
balar.  e  sheet value  of  fixed assets and  the  value of  wor&ing capital
5  In Hungary,  for example,  the enterprise  profits  tax took on greater
importance  in the 1960s,  surpassing  the turnovez  tax as the major source  of
budgetary  revenues. The 1968  reform  program  stressed  the  need for  uniformity
in enterprise  taxation  across  sectors,  in  order  to  provide  equal  incentives  to
enterprises. "Hungarian  People's  Republic,"  in International  Bureau  of Fiscal
Documentation,  p. 21.
6  This  process  of changing  the  rules  in an  ad  hoc fashion  after  profits
have  been  made  is  often  called  "leveling." It  results  in  part  from  assymetries
in information  between  the firm  and the government. The government  wants  to
capture  and redistribute  surplus  but only  the firms  know  what that  potential
surplus  is. So tax  rules  are  set  before  the  fact  that  encourage  production  and
efficiency,  but  they  are  changed  after  the  fact  to  capture  more  of  the  resulting
surplus.  The process of leveling  erodes the confidence  of managers and
ultimately creates strong incentives against increased work  effort or
improvements  in  efficiency  (Litwack,  1989).  Several  studies  have  documented  the
extent  to  which  socialist  tax  and  subsidy  schemes  redistribute  incomes--in  part
through  this leveling  process--from  more profitable  to less  profitable  firms
(Kornai,  1984;  Schaffer,  1989;  Vodopivec,  1990).  The  analysis  of  Yugoslav  firms
carried  out by Vodopivec  was extended  to include  not only explicit  taxes  and
subsidies  but also quasi-taxes  and subsidies  (through  forced  investments  at
negative  real  interest  rates)  as  well as the  inflation  tax.
I  As  with the  company  profits  tax  under  classical  socialism,  this  levy  on
fixed  assets--sometimes  called  a dividend--derives  more from  the government's
role  as owner  than  from  its  role  as tax  collector.6
("circulattng  means").  The  rate  was generally  62,  although  lower  rates  could
apply  in  certain  circumstances.  Similarly,  Hungary  levied  a  5Z  charge  on  assets
between  1964  and  1978,  and  Poland  introduced  such  an  "interest  charge"  on fixed
assets  as early  as 1959.8
Another  example  of a "reform  socialist"  tax  is  the  excess  wage tax,  used
as  a  means  of regulating  enterprise  wage determination  in the  absence  of labor
market  discipline.  Hungary  first  introduced  a  tax  on excessive  wage increases
(above  a prespecified  norm) after its  major 1968 economic  reform.  Several
overhauls  were  introduced  in the  1970s  and  1980s  in  an  attempt  to liberalize  and
reform  the  system  of  wage determination.  Poland  has  enforced  a  similar  type  of
tax  on excessive  wage increases  since  the  early  1980s. However,  these  schemes
have  generally  not  been  successful  at  limiting  wage  increases  because  of  the  many
systemic  and  ad hoc  exempLions  that  have  been  granted  along  the  way. 9
Finally,  another  unique  type  of  tax  typical  in  the  reform  socialist  systems
of  Eastern  Europe  is  the  tax  used  to  extract  rents  from  CMEA  trade." 0 This  trade
(mostly  comprised  of b.lateral  deals  with the  Soviet  Union)  has traditionally
been  at terms  that  favor  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe. They  have  been  able
to  import  raw  materials  at  a  low  price  and  export  manufactured  goods  at  a  premium
s  Poland  has reintroduced  this form of tax in its current  reform,  as
described  below.
9  Poland  is currently  attempting  to implement  a  very strict  excess  wage
tax  as  part  of its  1990  reform  package,  as described  in  greater  detail  below.
10  Such  a tax  also  has  a  role  in  post-socialist  transitional  economies  as
long  as  the  terms  of  CMEA  trade  diverge  from  world  market  prices. Revenues  from
such a tax are  of course  offset  by certain  export  and import  subsidies  also
needed  to correct  for  distorted  CMEA  prices  and  exchange  rates.7
relative  to  what they  might  draw  on the  world  market. 1'  Governments  have  used
the  tax  system  to capture  the  rents  of importers  and  exporters. The revenues
from such  taxes  can  be enormous;  for  example,  Hungary's  Special  Commodity  Tax
accounted  for  almost  as  much  revenue  as the  VAT  in 1988.
Post-socialist  transition
The  third  stage  of  reform  is  the  post-socialist  transitional  economy.  The
endpoint  of  the  transition  is  presumably  a  mature  market  economy  similar  to  those
in  Western  Europe. While  virtually  all  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  profess
a  desire  to  move  towards  this  model,  Hungary,  Poland,  and  Yugoslavia  a-e  the  most
advanced  in the  transitional  stage.  They are in the process  of adopting  the
major systemic  reforms  needed to take them there--for  example,  reforms  in
ownership,  industrial  structure,  pricing,  trade  policy,  financial  markets,  and
social  safety  nets.
The  important  and  independent  role  of taxes  in  a  mature  market  economy  is
familiar. Several  concerns  must always  be balanced  in designing  tax  policy,
including  the  adequacy  of  revenue  to  finance  government  operations  and  transfers,
efficiency  in the  use of factors  of production,  equity  in the distribution  of
income  and  wealth, ease of administration,  and interaction  with foreign  tax
systems. Yet the  balancing  process  is eased  by the  relative  stability  of the
underlying  economic  and  institutional  structure  in  these  countries;  analysis  can
be done  assuming  that  mp"t changes  will be  marginal.
In post-socialist  transition  economies,  the underlying  economic and
institutional  structure  is  much  less  stable,  and  needed  changes  are  not  marginal
"  These  diversions  from  world  market  prices  have  not necessarily  been
intentional  but  have  resulted  from  the  complexities  of  CMEA  pricing  and  exchange
rate  rules.8
but  fundamental  and  systemic.  Although  the  end  goal  may  be  familiar,  the  process
of  transition  is  fraught  with  difficulties,  not  only  for  the  economy  in  general,
but also for a fiscal  system  in particular.  In particular,  three sets of
problems  impose  constraints  on the  design  of  tax  policy  during  the  transition.
Macroeconomic  Concerns.
First, the  need  to  ensure macroeconomic  stability imposes strict
constraints  on  tax  policy. Budget  deficits  are  a root  cause  of instability  and
inflation,  as evidenced  again  and  again  in reforming  socialist  economies  such
as  Poland,  Hungary,  Yugoslavia,  the  U.S.S.R.,  and  China.  Stabilization  programs,
such as the current  Poland  program,  require  tight  fiscal  policies  to control
budget  deficits.  A tight  fiscal  stance  generally  leaves  little  room  for  revenues
to fall.  Therefore,  it is difficult  to eliminate  old and  reliable  sources  of
revenue  even  if they  do  not  support  the  goals  of  a  market  economy.
Maintaining  revenues  to  meet  balanced  budget  targets  during  the  transition
is even  more difficult  given  the  unemployment  and  the  slowdown  in growth  that
tend  .o  accompany  the  process.  In  Poland,  for  example,  output  fell  substantially
in the first  few  mcnths  of the stabilization  program, 1 2 as public  and  private
demand  fell  and  (..rms  were  subjected  to  changing  price  structures,  harder  budget
constraints,  and  world  market  competition.  When  output  and  employment  fall,  the
tax  base falls  as  well.  Furthermore,  unemployment  leads  to increased  demands
for  unemployment  compensation  and  thus for increased  revenuss  to finance  it.
Revenue  needs  clash  with  the  reality  of  the  downturn  and  the  need  to  reform  (and
12  Official  estimates  of the  fall  in output  in  the  first  three  months  of
1990  range  from  20%  to 30%,  although  some  observers  think  these  numbers--based
on poor statistics  and  failing  to include  the  benefits  of eliminating  queues-
-overstate  the  economic  hardship  somewhat.9
lower)  taxes  to spur  investment  and  restructuring.
Enterprise  Ownership  and  Structure.
When virtually  all enterprises  are owned  and controlled  by the state,
collecting  revenues  is  relative  y  easy. As  noted  earlier,  ad  hoc  changes  in  tax
rules  can  be  made  as  needed  to  meet  budget  targets  (although  such  changes  clearly
disrupt  the  credibility  and  thus  the  long-term  incentive  effects  of  the  system).
Such constant  ad hoc changes  have  been the  norm in all socialist  countries.
However,  as  state  ownership  is  diminished  thrcugh  privatization  and  as  new  (often
small)  private  activities  are  allowed  to emerge  spontaneously,  the  tax system
needs  to become  more  predictable  and less  discretionary.  The introduction  of
more  democratic  processes  in  the  political  sphere  also  puts  limits  on  the  number
of changes  in tax  policy  that  are feasible  in a given  period. The etate  thus
loses  a  large  degree  of  flexibility  in  raising  revenues  as  needed  to  close  budget
deficits.  The  entire  process  of  privatization,  so  critical  to  long-term  economic
reform,  could  in  this  way  be jeopardized  by fiscal  concerns.
Furthermore,  privatization  and the accompanying  loosening  of direct
controls  over productive  activity  heightens  the influence  of tax rules  over
economic  behavior. All of the tradeoffs  facing  tax  policy  in mature  market
economies--generally  balancing  revenue,  efficiency,  and  equity  concerns--begin
to  come  into  play. For  ample,  the  potential  deadweight  lose  from  high  marginal
effective  tax rates increases  significantly. The need to support  increased
investment  and  efficiency  in  resource  use  further  limits  the  flexibility  of  the
revenue  system.
Finally,  expanded  private  ownership  creates  pockets  of vested  interest
independent  from the state.  The fact that these  interests  can assert  heavy10
pressures  to block  change  later  on  argues  for  getting  tax  policy  right  early  in
the  process.  This  lesson  is  well  illustrated  in  Hungary,  where  earlier  personal
income  tax  reforms  gave  generous  exemptions  to individuals  and  earlier  company
tax reforms  put very generous  incentives  in place  for foreign  investors  (see
below). These  are  now  quite  difficult  to  remove  because  of  the  vested  interests
that  have  arisen  to preserve  them.
Institutional  Weakness.
Most socialist  or post-socialist  countries  are  very poorly  equipped  for
the modern,  relatively  impersonal  tax administration  called  for in a market
economy.  In  traditiona  or  reform  sociqlism,  tax  administrators  are  part  of  the
ownership  and  control  structure  of  government,  and  they  have  unrestricted  access
to  enterprise  books  and  records. State  enterprises  tend  to  be  quite  large,  and
therefore  the  number  of  registered  taxpayers  tends  to  be relatively  small  given
the  size  of the  economy.
Tax  administration  in a  market  economy  with  many  independent  firms  (both
small  and large)  and  thus  many taxpayers  calls  for  a different  set  of skills-
-skills  that  tend  to  be lacking  in  socialist  economies.  For  example,  techniques
of  selective  auditing  and  tax  enforcement  need  to  be developed;  so  do  accounting
practices  and  a reliable  and  objective  legal  framework  for  dispute  resolution.
Furthermore,  the  public  needs  to  be  well-versed  in  principles  of tax  policy  and
methods  of tax compliance. Not only do all of these  countries  need a major
effort  to develop  the  institutional  capacity  for  tax  administration,  but  they
should carefully  consider  the administrative  dimension  when designing  the
substance  of tax  reform.
Institutional  development  takes  time,  and  thus  true  tax  reform  will take1I
ti  i.  Yet this does not necessarily  mean that the process of substantive tax
reform should be delayed.  An noted above, putting well-designed, clear, and
simple tax laws in place early in the reform process may prevent the future
blocking of reforms once private interest groups take hold.
Illustrations: Tax Systems in Various Reforming Countries
Huniarv
Hungary has gone farthest down the road of tax reform of any socialist
country.  From 1949 to 1967 its tax system approximated that of a traditional
socialist  economy,  dominated  by  a  production turnover  tax  and a  tax  on  enterprise
profits (amounting to all of the enterprises' planned profits and a portion of
surplus profits).  These were later supplemented  by the payroll tax (in 1958),
the social insurance fee (in  1958),  and the 5% charge on firm assets (in 1964).
The major reforms in the economic  management system enacted in 1968  were
accompanied by  important tax reforms, as  the tax  system took on more  of a
regulatory role in addition to its basic revenue-raising role.  Profits taxes
increased in importance  and  were designed to give  more incentive  for efficiency
in input use.  The regulatory role of turnover taxes in controlling consumer
prices  and insulating  the domestic  economy  from international  price developmeats
became  more  important  as  compared  to  their budgetary  role.  Authorities
increasingly used the payroll tax, social insurance contribution, and tax on
incremental wages  as means of regulating enterprise wage  determinations and
policies.  The tax system  became more and  more complex  with the introduction  of
new taxes, the proliferation of tax rates, and the granting of tax preferences.
The  tax  regime was  highly  differentiated by  sec.:tor  and often  individually
negotiated by enterprise.12
Finally, the Hungarians implemented a major tax reform in 1988  with the
introduction of a VAT and a personal income  tax, followed in 1989  with a reform
of the company income tax.  These modern taxes set the stage for the transition
from a reform socialist  economy to a  post-socialist economy in transition.  The
reform was intended to move away from a complex and discretionary system of
taxation to  one based more  on the  objectives of neutrality,  stability and
transparency, The  new taxes  do indeed--for  the first  time--look  quite  a lot  like
the taxes in mature western economies.  However, the problems of transition
noted earlier have  clearly imposed constraints on the achievement of these
obj  ectives.
Macroeconomic Concerns.
A  major  problem  in  the  transition has  been macroeconomic  stability.
Although the budget had been in surplus in 1984, it eroded significantly in the
following two years.  The budget deficit exceeded 32 of GDP in 1986 and 1987.
There was no room for revenue shortfall  when tax reform began in 1988.
The need to maintain budget balance (combined  with a penchant for "fine-
tuning" as discussed later) forced general tax rates to remain high in the new
system.  The maximum personal income tax rate was 602 when the tax came into
force in 1988, and VAT rates  were relatively high at 252 (the  normal rate) and
15% (mostly applicable to services)."
3 The company tax rate after the 1989
reform was 50Z, with a one-time additional 4% charged in 1989 for budgetary
purposes. While these  rates  may not  seem  particularly  excessive  in  mature  market
13  Furthermore, for fear of revenue loss the creditability of taxes paid
or.  investment goods is  being phased in over a five-year  period.  Only 40% of the
tax was creditable in 1989.  One-hundred percent will be creditable beginning
in 1992.13
economies, they are hardly conducive to new investment or higher work effort.
Furthermore, high marginal rates put a strain on any tax  administration because
of  the heightened benefits  taxpayers can  gain through evasion.  For  these
reasons,  macroeconomic constraints  and  the  urgent  need to  maintain revenue  yield
clashed  with other  goals--investment,  efficiency,  and institutional  development-
-in the Hungarian reform.
The 1988 reforms did in fact succeed in maintaining revenues.  Yields on
the new VAT and personal income tax were close to anticipated, with  the VAT
bringing in much more than the previous turnover tax.  Because of a concurrent
increase in profit tax revenues (under  the old system), total revenues rose by
3 percentage points of GDP from 1987 to 1988.  Total expenditures rose only
slightly, and the budget deficit fell from just over 3Z in 1987 co  just under
1Z in 1988.14  However, revenues fell  significantly  in 1989  with the introduction
of the new profits tax (with its  many exemptions)  and general  stagnation in the
economy.' 5 Only through expenditure cuts did the Hungarians manage to keep the
overall budget deficit close to the 1988 figure.
Enterprise Reform.
Hungary  must  weigh its  desire  to  promote changes  in  enterprise structure,
ownership, and efficiency against these macroeconomic concerns.  Increasing
privatization of the economy and increasing exposure to market forces need to
be accompanied  by less  distortionary,  more predictable  tax regimes. The reforms
of 1988 and 1989  went a long  way in this  direction.  Furthermore,  as part of its
14  IMF  staff estimates, calculated using Government Finance Statistics
conventions.
1  Virtually no growth occurred in 1988  or 1989.14
post-socialist transition, Hungary is now moving further to reduce the role of
the  state  by cutting  expenditures (particularly  subsidies)  and allowing  revenues
to fall concurrently.  Maximum tax rates for personal and company income taxes
were reduced in January 1990 to 502 and 402, respectively.
1"
However, in the view of most observers, Hungary made one mistake in its
initial tax reform process that now makes change more difficult.  In a desire
to  promote  growth  and equity--combined  with a  confidence  in  the ability  to "fine-
tune" the economy through central directives,  perhaps a holdover from previous
days--it loaded  all of its  new taxes  with a  myriad of exemptions  and exceptions.
For example, the personal income tax exempts an estimated two-thirds of all
personal income, including  not only a generous tax-exempt  amount (slightly  over
one-half  average earnings),  but  also  social  security and  other  transfers,
pensions, and  most income from farming.  The VAT exempts all financial,  health,
education, sports,  and cultural services;  it "zero-rates"  many goods, including
processed  foods,  medicines  and  medical  equipment,  books  and  periodicals,
transportation services,  and many sources  of energy.  The profits tax specifies
reduced  rates  for  certain activities,  including public  utility  and  health
services,  cultural  and sports  activities,  agriculture,  food  processing,  and food
retailing,  It is  particularly generous to foreigners investing in a  wide range
of activities of "special importance".` 7 Joint ventures with foreigners (with
a  very  modest limit--202  or  5  million forints--on  required  foreign  participation)
are eligible not  only for a five-year tax holiday, but also for a 602 tax
16  State-owned enterprises must also pay a "dividend" of  182 of after-
tax profits, making the effective profits tax rate 50.82.  The personal income
tax  rate  was reduced  in 1989  from 622  to  562,  before being  again reduced in  1990.
17  These  include  tourism,  telecommunications,  and  a  wide  range  of
manufacturing operations.15
reduction after the five-year period and a rebate of any taxes of the foreign
partner reinvested  in Hungary.  Under such a generous regime,  it would  be
surprising if such joint  ventures ever paid taxes in Hungary.
The fine-tuning incorporated  into the reformed  Hungarian tax laws  will be
difficult  to change given the  vested interests  that have formed around  it.  The
new government has expressed a desire to reduce the generous exemptions given
to foreign investment, but some fear that this might create uncertainty and
suspicion  in the  foreign  community. The  government  has also  expressed  the  desire
to  lower VAT  rates and narrow  the range of goods subject  to the 0% rate.
However, bringing previously exempt income into the personal income tax or the
VAT will be difficult, although many of these items are fully taxed in other
countries and could legitimately have been included in the tax net from the
beginning.  Any increase in the personal income tax coverage is particularly
problematic. Hungary's government suffered  great political cost in introducing
a  high-rate personal income tax early in the game." 8
Administrative Concerns.
Although Hungary has ihad  more experience  with tax policy formulation and
tax administration  than other  reforming socialist  economies, it  will still  need
time and technical assistance  to improve  auditing and enforcement  capabilities.
According to Hungarian observers, the tax administration is not yet capable of
enforcing taxes on "hard-to-tax" groups.  For example, most income from self-
employment (including "moonlighting",  a major source of income for many) is de
facto tax exempt due to difficulties in collection.  This can lead to great
18  This is true even though wages and salaries in the socialized sector
were grossed up to cover the additional tax burden.16
inequities  in the system; doctors in state-owned  clinics, for  example, are said
to earn  well over  one-half of their income  from  extra  payments and  moonlighting.
Fine-tuning a tax system  with many exemptions  and exceptions adds to the
complexity  of  administration.  Hungary  could  benefit  from  extensive  tax
simplification,  broadening  tax  bases and  lowering  tax rates. Although inflation
is significant (about 20% in 1989) and may be rising, indexing the tax system
for inflation could put additional administrative  strains on an already overly-
complex system.  Many hope that the economic program now in place will lower
inflation and thus reduce the need for indexing.
Poland
Poland is  taking the "big  bang" approach  to economic reform,  adopting  many
far-reaching changes simultaneously.  While it has not gone far down the road
of tax reform yet, plans are underway to  make major changes in the next couple
of years.
Post-war  Poland  adopted  the  classical  socialist  system  of  central  planning.
All major e-conomic  variables  were controlled  through  the  plan, and  taxes did  not
have an independent role in influencing eco omic decision making at the firm
level.  The turnover tax--the  main tax instrument--joined  with subsidies (their
mirror  image) to  fulfill the  traditional  function of  providing  government
revenues and  constraining demand to fit planned  supply through the use  of
thousands of specific rates.
Poland's early  moves  away from  classical  socialism  toward  reform socialism
can be dated from the early 1970s, when the Polish authorities introduced an
experiment  in  decentralized  economic  management. The turnover  tax  was simplified
into a system based on ad valorem rates, and was used for the first time to17
indirectly  influence  output  mix  by  charging  lower  rates  of  tax  on favored  goods.
Payroll  taxes  were introduced  to influence  wage-setting,  and an "interest"
charge  on fixed  assets,  first  introduced  in  1959,  was incorporated  into  the  new
system.
The  reform  program  of 1981-82  represented  the  most far-ranging  effort  at
reform  since  the adoption  of central  planning. It  was based  on the  desire  to
use  economic  instruments,  including  fiscal  policy,  to  guide  enterprise  behavior
and increase  enterprise  efficiency  indirectly.  The turnover  tax  continued  to
be  a  major  tax  instrument.  It  remained  highly  differentiated  by  product,  having
hundreds  of  rates  and  subject  to  ad  hoc  change  at any  time. The  payroll  tax  was
supplemented  in 1982  with a tax  on  excess  wages  in an attempt  to alleviate  the
rise  in  the  wage  bill. A  progressive  company  profits  tax  was  introduced  in  1982.
It  was changed  to a flat  60Z  tax  in 1984  (raised  to 65%  in 1985)  in  an attempt
to encourage  increases  in  production.  A growing  number  of systemic  and  ad  hoc
tax exemptions  and reliefs  in the  1980s  led  to ever  increasing  complexity  and
fine differentiations  in tax  burden  among  sectors  and individual  firms." 9 By
1987,  the  turnover  tax  had  about  400  rates,  about  one-third  of  enterprise  income
was  effectively  exempt  from  tax  through  negotiated  reliefs,  and  the  entire  system
was heavily  burdened  by the  efforts  of the  authorities  to direct  the  "reformed
socialist"  economy  to desired  ends.  These  major taxes  were supplemented  by
numerous  less  important  (but  nonetheless  complex)  ones,  including  a salary  tax
(on income  from activity  in the nonsocialized  sector),  a highly  progressive
"equalization  tax" on individual  wages (from  any activity)  above a certain
"  These  included,  for  example,  tax  rate  reductions  for  exporting  firms  (to
counteract  an overvalued  exchange  rate),  three-year  tax helidays  for high-
technology  enterprises,  and  lower  tax  rates  for  social  organizations  engaged  in
education,  health,  or  cultural  activities,  not  to  mention  numerous  tax  reductions
negotiated  on an individualized  basis  with ailing  firms.18
amount,  an  urban  property  tax,  an  agricultural  tax,  and  numerous  lump-sum  taxes
intended  to substitute  for  turnover  and  income  taxes  on small  taxpayers.
In late  1989  and  early  1990,  Poland  introduced  a  non-communist  government
and  radical  steps  toward  economic  reform. This  reflected  a fundamental  change
in goals  away  from  reform  socialism  toward  post-socialist  transition  to a free
market  economy.  Concurrently,  initial  steps  were made to move toward  a  more
neutral and  transparent tax  system conducive to  market  behavior and
privatization.  For  the  first  time,  the  turnover  and  income  tax  regimes  were  made
almost  the  same  for  socialized  and  nonsocialized  firms. 20 The  number  of  turnover
tax  rates  was reduced  to  only  about  14 (11  general  rates  plus  special  rates  on
alcohol,  petroleum,  and  cigarettes)  in January  1990. Company  income  tax  rates
were reduced  (earlier  in 1989)  to 40Z,  and  most special  incentives  (including
those  for  export  and  investment)  were eliminated.  The  "dividend"  required  of
state  enterprises  was strengthened  to offset  the  revenue  loss  from  the  reduced
company  tax rate,  to force  the efficient  use of assets,  and to identify  both
viable  firms  and  firms  that  are  nonviable  and  should  be liquidated. 2"  Finally,
20  The  main  remaining  differences  in  tax  treatment  by owner  or sector  are
that  foreign  joint  ventures  are  eligible  for  3-year  tax  holidays,  and  domestic
firms  in  some  sectors--such  as  pharmaceuticals,  housing,  and  food  processing  are
eligible  for  tax  holidays  of 3-10  years.
21  As noted  earlier,  this  dividend  derives  from  the government's  role  as
owner  rather  than  its  role  as tax  collector,  and  thus  it is  not  a "tax"  in  the
traditional  meaning  of the term.  The Polish  authorities  estimate  that the
dividend  will amount  to  about  5-10  percent  of  enterprise  asset  value  on  average
per  year.  By law,  the  required  dividend  for  1990  is  set  at 32Z  of the  value  of
the firms  "founding  fund". The founding  fund  is a share  of the firms  assets
calculated  as the  net book  value  at the end  of 1983,  increased  by subsequent
capital  transfers  from  the government  and the  capitalization  of any previous
dividend  requirements  not paid by the firm.  Any increments  resulting  from
revaluation  of assets  or retained  earnings  from  1983  to 1989  are  added  to the
"enterprise  fund"  and  not  included  in  the  founding  fund. In January  1990  firms
were instructed  to revalue  assets,  with different  revaluation  coefficients
depending  on  the  type  of  assets,  but  the  average  coefficient  being  about  14,  with
the incremental  value  to be allocated  proportionately  between  the two funds.19
a  very  steep  excess  wage  tax  was  imposed  on  enterprises  to  control  wage  increases
during  the  stabilization  period. 22
Polish  authorities  are  preparing  the  ground  for  a  major  tax  reform  effort
in 1991  and  1992. They  plan  to  introduce  a  modern,  global  income  tax  in  January
1991,  2  and  a VAT  in 1991  or 1992. In  making  these  reforms  the  Poles  face  many
of the same  constraints  as the  Hungarians. First,  insuring  adequate  revenues
to maintain  budget  balance  is critical  during  the  stabilization  period. The
budget  deficit  soared  to  about  8  percent  in 1989,  and  the 1990  budget  projects
a  much tighter  fiscal  stance,  with a deficit  of  only  about  one  percent  of  GDP.
While the easing  of inflation  through  the stabilization  program  will boost
revenues  considerably  in real terms (by  eliminating  the real  cost of lags in
collection),  the downturn  in economic  activity  accompanying  the stabilization
program  reduces  the tax base for many revenue  items.  For example,  the 1990
budget  predicts  a 42%  real  rise  in company  income  tax  revenues  (equivalent  to
a  jump  of  over  3  percentage  points  of  GDP);  one  wonders  if  this  is  feasible  given
the  reported  downturn  of at  least  20%  in industrial  production.  Revenues  from
the  turnover  and  wage  taxes  are  projected  to fall  in  real  terms;  this  would  seem
more consistent  with expected  economic  trends.  In any case,  macroeconomic
concerns  make it  unlikely  that  the  Poles  can  lower  tax  rates  significantly  in
On  average  about  one-third  of  a  firm's  capital  is  allocated  to  the  founding  fund,
while two-thirds  are  allocated  to the  enterprise  fund.
22  Specifically,  the  increment  in the  total  wage bill is  to be taxed  at
a  very progressive  rate (from  200%  up to 500%)  if it increases  faster  than a
certain  proportion  of the  monthly  inflation  rate.  That  proportion  was set  at
0.3  in  January,  0.2  in  February,  March,  and  April,  and  0.6  from  May  on.
23  The tax would replace five current taxes and would apply four
progressive  rates  up  to  50, with  a  maximum  average  rate  of  40X,  the  same  as  the
company  income  tax  rate. The  only  exemptions  proposed  are  on  agricultural  income
(separately  taxed  under  the  agricultural  tax)  and  possibly  interest  income  and
capital  gains  on the  sale  of shares  and  bonds.20
the near future.
In addition, administrative concerns  pose a significant  constraint on tax
reform.  Because of the relative  newness of its  major reform efforts,  Poland  has
not had the experience that  even  Hungary has  had  with modern tax administration.
Until  the  tax administration  is trained  in modern  auditIng and  collection
techniques, it could be risky to move quickly on  major changes to redefine the
tax system and expand the tax net.  On the other hand, there is  merit to  moving
quickly to reform the tax system before vested interests are created through
expanded private ownership.
Fiscal  concerns  could  also  complicate  the  debate  on  privatization.
Widespread  private ownership would  mean  the disappearance of a  significant
revenue source, the "dividend" required from public enterprises.  Projected
dividend revenues account for almost 9% of total revenues in the 1990 budget,
and  their  budgetary importance  is  increasing  rather  than  decreasing,  as  the  Poles
move to impose stricter profit expectations on state enterprises.  The cost of
foreE ne dividends could in theory be offset  by revenues from the sale of state
assets.  This would require that those assets be properly valued and carefully
sold  to  the highest  bidder,  a  process  that  could  slow  down privatization
considerably at a time  when many are insisting  that it  must go forward rapidly.
In addition, the tax administration is likely to have more difficulty
collecting taxes from privatized firms  (especially if they are granted tax
incentives) than from public enterprises.  Auditing financial statements and
enforcing  tax  requirements  on  independent  firms  and  individuals  are  very
different and more complex tasks than collecting rudimentary taxes from state-
owned and state-controlled firms.
Finally, the government will find it more difficult to introduce ad hoc21
revenue  measures  at  will to close  a  budget  gap,  as has  often  been  the  practice
in the past.  A tax system  needs to be relatively  stable,  transparent,  and
nondiscretionary  to attract  and  support  productive  private  investment,  whether
domestic  or foreign.
Other  Reforming  European  Socialist  Countries
None of the  other  reforming  socialist  countries  has yet made the  moves
taken  or  contemplated  by  Hungary  and  Poland  to  radically  reform  their  tax  systems
in  line  with  a  move  toward  post-socialist  transition.  Some  of  them--most  notably
Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia--are  preparing  to  move  in  that  direction,  however.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
Czechoslovakia's  main  sources of  revenues until  1967 were  those
traditionally  found  in  classical  socialist  economies--including  the  turnover  tax,
public  enterprise  profit taxes (including  "output"  and "performance"  taxes,
levies on assets, and dividends),  a wage tax, and a tax on agricultural
activities,  and some  other  minor  taxes  on specific  activities.  From  1967  to
the  early  1970s,  subsequent  to the "New  Economic  System  Directive"  in January
1967,  a series  of  changes  were  made (similar  to  those  in  Poland  and  Hungary)  to
increase  the  independent  regulatory  role  of  the  tax  system. The  ingredients  are
familiar--complex,  differentiated,  and  generally high-rate 24 levies  on
manufacturers'  turnover,  profits,  capital,  payroll  (including  social  security
24  For  example,  profit  levy  has  generally  been  assessed  at a rate  of 752,
and  social  security  contributions  are  generally  set  at 50%  of payroll. As in
other  socialist  countries,  the convention  under  the turnover  tax  has  been to
quote  the  rate  as  a  percentage  of  the  tax-inclusive  price,  rather  than  the  tax-
exclusive  price  as used in the  West.  Thus, a tax of 50% represents  a 100%
addition to the  base (or tax-exclusive)  price.  "Czechoslovak  Socialist
Republic",  in  International  Bureau  of Fiscal  Documentation.22
corntributions),  and  incremental  wages.
A similar  system  remains  today,  although  the general  payroll  tax was
abolished  in  1978  and  replaced  with  an  individualized  wage  tax  and  company  social
security  contributions  (based  on  payroll).  The  largest  sources  of  revenuw  remain
profits  and  turnover  taxes  paid  by  state  enterprises  (together  about  two-thirds
of total  tax  revenue). Because  Czechoslovakia  has a federal  systeta,  revenue
sources  are  divided  between  the  federal  budget,  the  republics'  (Czech  and  Slovak)
budgets, and the budgets of  the  "national  committees"  'iocal government
entities). The  Federal  budget  receives  all  foreign  trade  tax  revenues  as  well
as profit  taxes from federally  controlled  state enterprises;  the republic's
budgets  receive  taxes  from  republic-controlled  state  enterprises;  the  national
committees  receive  wage tax  revenues  from  individuals.  Turnover  tax  revenues,
which previously  went to the federal  government,  are to be divided  equally
between  the  federal  government  and  the  republics  from  1990  on.
As  Czechoslovakia  enters  the  stage  of  post-socialist  transition,  it  plans
to reform  the  tax  system  to bring  it  more in line  with the  needs  of a  private
market  economy  and to harmonize  it with the tax systems  of other European
countries. The Czechs  plan  to introduce  a  value-added  tax,  a unified  company
profits  tax,  and  a global  personal  income  tax  in  1993.2'  In doing  so they  will
face many of the constraints--related  to macroeconomic  policy, 26 enterprise
reform,  and  administrative  capacity--now  facing  Hungary  and  Poland.
25  They are taking small intermediate  steps now.  Transitional  laws
recently  passed  by Parliament  extended  turnover  and profits  taxes  to newly-
legitimized  private  businesses,  and another  new law  imposes  a personal  income
tax  on private  non-wage  income.
26  However,  to date  Czechoslovakia  1eis  managed  to avoid  the  large  budget
deficits  and  accompanying  inflation  that  have  plagued  Poland  and  to  some  extent
Hungary.23
YUGOSLAVIA.
Although  the  types  of  taxes  that  exist  in  Yugoslavia  are  similar  to those
in  other  reform  socialist  countries,  the  country  is  a  very  unique  case  because
of its  highly  decentralized  federalist  structure.  Enterprise  and  turnover  taxes
(the  latter  generally  charged  at the  retail  level)  are  highly  variable  across
sectors  and  republics/provinces, 27 with varying  rates  and  many systemic  and ad
hoc  exemptions.  Turnover  taxes  are  relatively  less  important  than  in  most  other
socialist  countries,  accounting  for  about  2OZ  of  total  public  sector  revenues,
compared  with about 65% for assessments  on enterprises.  In addition  to
enterprise  income and payroll taxes,  large "contributions"  are required  of
Yugoslav  firms  for  various  social  funds. Each fund is in essence  a separate
taxing  authority  with earmarked  revenues;  thus,  the  administrative  system  for
revenue  and  budget  administration  is  highly  fragmented  and  costly.
Individuals  are subject in principle  to ten complex and convoluted
schedular  taxes  plus  a highly  progressive  tax  on total  earnings  over  a certain
level.  Taxes on wages are collected  through  withholding;  other taxes on
individual  activities  (for  example,  on property  and property  income,  private
sector  income,  and  agricultural  activities)  are  probably  not  widely  collected
in  practice  due  to  the  almost  impossible  administrative  challenge  they  present.
Yugoslavia  is  interested  in  undertaking  major  reforms  in its  tax  system,
including  the  adoption  of a VAT  and  modern  company  and  personal  income  taxes.
However,  the political  and economic  tensions  between the provinces--not  to
mention  the  country's  very  tight  macroeconomic  constraints  and  the  decentralized
and inefficient  tax  administration  apparatus--will  make the  process  extremely
27  Yugoslavia  has six  "republics"  and  two  "automonous  provinces".24
difficult  in the  near term.
U.S.S.R.
Unlike  the  other  countries  discussed  above,  the  U.S.S.R.  is  still  clearly
in the  reform  socialist  stage,  although  some  Soviet  reformers  are  beginning  to
express  a  desire  to move toward  a market  economy  based  on private  ownership.
The  current  tax  system  fits  the  reform  socialist  model--complex,  dedicated  to
"fine-tuning",  and constantly  subject  to discretionary  change."  As  in other
socialist  economies,  the great  bulk of revenues  (over  90X) comes  from  state-
owned  productive  units,  in particular  from  turnover  taxes  and  profit  payments
paid by large  state  enterprises. Although  there  are  numerous  tax laws  that
pertain  to individuals, 29 in  sum  they  impose  a  very  low  direct  tax  burden  on  the
population,  because  of both low  rates  and  many exemptions  (not  to  mention  lax
enforcement).
The  evolution  of tax  policy  in the  U.S.S.R.  has  been similar  to that  in
the other countries  discussed  earlier,  except  that the commitment  to post-
socialist  transition  is yet to be made.  Turnover  and profit  taxes in the
U.S.S.R.  date  from  1930,  when  they  replaced  dozens  of  separate  types  of  payments
to  the  treasury. A move  to greater  enterprise  autonomy  in  the  mid-1960s  under
the "new  conditions  of economic  management"  was accompanied  by changes  in the
28  Keeping  up  with  the  constant  stream  of  recent  changes  in  the  Soviet  tax
system  is virtually  impossible  for  Western  observers. According  to Litwack
(1989,  pg. 24), "In 1989, significant  discretionary  changes in taxes and
incentives  for  state  enterprises  ...  occured  almost  on a  monthly  basis." For
an overview  of the development  of the  Soviet  tax system  until  the  mid-1980s,
see "Union  of Soviet  Socialist  Republics,"  in International  Bureau  of Fiscal
Documentation.
29  These  include  the tax  on  wages  of factory  and office  workers,  tax  on
author's  fees, tax on outside  earnings,  social  insurance  contributions,  the
agricultural  tax,  and  even  a  tax  on  bachelors  and  married  women  with  no  children.25
tax  system intended  to  stimulate  greater  productivity  and  efficiency. The  system
provided for  three  types  of  payments  out  of  enterprise  profits  that  still  existed
into the 1980s.  These include charges on fixed production assets and working
capital (generally at a 6% rate), fixed rental payments (primarily in oil and
gas and  mining), and residual profit  payments (individually  negotiated based on
plan norms).  These have been supplemented  over time  with specialized  tax rules
covering  certain types of  cooperative  and individual  activity,  as  well as income
earned  by  foreigners  and  joint  ventures.  Recent  changes  include  the
introduction, in  October, 1989, of a heavy tax on the growth of  wage funds over
a 32 limit.
The  Soviets are increasinigly  facing the macroeconomic instability and
deterioration in  enterprise efficiency that  have plagued other countries in the
stage of socialist reform.  The 1989 budget deficit is estimated to have been
over 13% of GDP, and repressed inflation combined  with widespread shortages of
goods are driving more and more economic activity to the underground economy.
The complex  and discretionary  tax system  is a reflection  of  much larger economic
and political problems beyond the scope of this paper.  Significant tax reform
may be impossible unless and until the Soviet Union abandons '.ts  commitment to
reform socialism.
Options for the Future
As the countries of Eastern Europe  move into the stage of post-socialist
transition,  they  face  both  constraints  and opportunities  in  setting  up new  fiscal
systems to underlie their reform efforts.  Some of the constraints have been
discussed in  detail  above. But they  also  have  significant  opportunities  to  avoil
the  previous  mistakes  of  many developed  and developing  countries  and  put in  place26
from  the  beginning  tax  systems  that  encourage  efficiency,  equity  and  growth  while
assuring  adequate  revenues  for  the  central  functions  of government.
The  most  obvious  recommendation  for  the  medium  term  is to  adopt  a fairly
traditional  yet  relatively  simple,  low  rate  tax  system  along  the  lines  of  those
in some  Western  market  economies. Such a system  would presumably  include  a
standard  company  income  tax (with  a maximum  rate in the range  of 30-50S),  a
global  personal  income  tax  (with  a  maximum  rate  no  higher  than  501  and  preferably
lower),  and  a  comprehensive  retail  VAT  of  the  standard  European  type  with  as  few
rates  as  possible  (preferably  only  one). While  the  design  of each  type  of tax
requires  decisions  on many detailed  issues,  the public  finance  literature  is
replete  with analyses  of the  various  tradeoffs  involved  in  each.  This  option
has  many advantages;  not only can it lessen  tax-induced  economic  distortions
prevalent  in  more  complex  systems,  but  it  is  familiar  to  potential  investors  and
trading  partners  and  harmonizes  well  with the  tax  systems  of other  countries.
The  second  oDtion  is  to  adopt  a  fairly  traditional  tax  systdm--with  company
and personal income taxes and a VAT--but to load each tax with numerous
exemptions  and  exceptions  and  to tax  the  remaining  base  at relatively  high  and
complex  structure  of rates. This  has  been  the  course  taken  so far  in Hungary.
It may also  be the  course  that  other  countries  are  most likely  to drift  into,
because  of  both  political  and  social  concerns  for  equity  and  the  legacy  of  fine-
tuning  left  over  from  central  planning.  Many  believe  it  would  be a  more  costly
choice  than  the  first  option  because  of the  unnecessary  administrative  burdens
and  the  distorted  incentives  it  would  create.
A third option  is to consider  adopting  a new type of tax system  not
necessarily  similar  to those  in  Western  market  economies. For  example,  public
finance  literature  makes  a  strong  case  for  replacing  an  income  tax  with  a  direct27
"consumption"  or "expenditure"  tax.'° Some  variants  of such  a tax are levied
only  on  consumption,  while  others  exempt  the  returns  to  savings  and  investment."
Each  attempts  to  eliminate  the  income  tax's  inherent  bias  against  savings  (i.e.
future  consumption)  in favor  of present  consumption.  A tax  of this  type  would
thus  spur  enhanced  savings,  investment,  and  growth.  Furthermore,  such  a tax  can
be easier  to administer  than  an income  tax  if it allows  immediate  writeoff  of
investment  expenditures  and  thus  eliminates  the  need  for  depreciation,  inflation
indexing,  or  the  calculation  of capital  gains. The  fact  that  no  country  has  yet
adopted  such a tax is attributable  in part to the difficulty  of fundamental
change  once  a  traditional  system  is  in  place;  given  that  the  countries  of  Eastern
Europe  (other  than  Hungary)  have  no  such  system  yet  in  place,  they  might  be  ideal
testing  grounds  for  new,  innovative  ideas  that  many  consider  superior  to current
practice  in the  West.  They  would  have  to  be careful,  however,  to  work out  the
international  implications  of  any  such  experiment,  given  their  c mon desire  to
further  integrate  their  economies  with other  mature  market  economies  (the  EEC
in particular);
The  next  step  for  post-socialist  economies  in  transition  should  be  to  work
out  the  implications  of  different  courses  of  action  for  tax  reform. Taking  into
account  the  goals  and  cor.straints  in  each  particular  case,  what  are  the  pros  and
cons  of  various  options? What  do  they  imply  for  revenues,  for  the  distribution
of the  tax  burden,  for  savings  and  investment  (both  foreign  and  domestic),  for
tax  administration,  even  perhaps  for  the  environment?  What  major  problems  would
be likely  to arise  during  the transition  to each?  Such analysis  is of some
30  See,  for  example,  Andrews  (1974),  Bradford  (1980),  Mieszkowski  (1980),
and  Zodrow  and  McLure  (1988). Charles  McLure  (1990)  has  perceptively  noted  the
potential  benefits  of  this  approach  for  Eastern  Europe.
31 Under  certain  circumstances  the  two  types  are  equivalent.28
urgency;  given  the  speed  of transition,  irrevocable  decisions--whether  good  or
bad--are  likely  to  be made  sooner  rather  than  later.29
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